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Abstract—The precautionary principle (PP) states that if an
action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to
the public domain (affecting general health or the environment
globally), the action should not be taken in the absence of
scientific near-certainty about its safety. Under these conditions,
the burden of proof about absence of harm falls on those
proposing an action, not those opposing it. PP is intended to deal
with uncertainty and risk in cases where the absence of evidence
and the incompleteness of scientific knowledge carries profound
implications and in the presence of risks of "black swans",
unforeseen and unforeseable events of extreme consequence.
This non-naive version of the PP allows us to avoid paranoia
and paralysis by confining precaution to specific domains and
problems. Here we formalize PP, placing it within the statistical
and probabilistic structure of “ruin” problems, in which a
system is at risk of total failure, and in place of risk we use
a formal"fragility" based approach. In these problems, what
appear to be small and reasonable risks accumulate inevitably
to certain irreversible harm. Traditional cost-benefit analyses,
which seek to quantitatively weigh outcomes to determine the best
policy option, do not apply, as outcomes may have infinite costs.
Even high-benefit, high-probability outcomes do not outweigh
the existence of low probability, infinite cost options—i.e. ruin.
Uncertainties result in sensitivity analyses that are not mathe-
matically well behaved. The PP is increasingly relevant due to
man-made dependencies that propagate impacts of policies across
the globe. In contrast, absent humanity the biosphere engages in
natural experiments due to random variations with only local
impacts.
Our analysis makes clear that the PP is essential for a limited
set of contexts and can be used to justify only a limited set
of actions. We discuss the implications for nuclear energy and
GMOs. GMOs represent a public risk of global harm, while
harm from nuclear energy is comparatively limited and better
characterized. PP should be used to prescribe severe limits on
GMOs.
I. INTRODUCTION
THe aim of the precautionary principle (PP) is to preventdecision makers from putting society as a whole—or a
significant segment of it—at risk from the unexpected side
effects of a certain type of decision. The PP states that if an
action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to
the public domain (such as general health or the environment),
and in the absence of scientific near-certainty about the safety
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of the action, the burden of proof about absence of harm falls
on those proposing the action. It is meant to deal with effects
of absence of evidence and the incompleteness of scientific
knowledge in some risky domains.1
We believe that the PP should be evoked only in extreme
situations: when the potential harm is systemic (rather than
localized) and the consequences can involve total irreversible
ruin, such as the extinction of human beings or all life on the
planet.
The aim of this paper is to place the concept of precaution
within a formal statistical and risk-analysis structure, ground-
ing it in probability theory and the properties of complex
systems. Our aim is to allow decision makers to discern which
circumstances require the use of the PP and in which cases
evoking the PP is inappropriate.
II. DECISION MAKING AND TYPES OF RISK
Taking risks is necessary for individuals as well as for
decision makers affecting the functioning and advancement of
society. Decision and policy makers tend to assume all risks
are created equal. This is not the case. Taking into account the
structure of randomness in a given system can have a dramatic
effect on which kinds of actions are, or are not, justified. Two
kinds of potential harm must be considered when determining
an appropriate approach to the role of risk in decision-making:
1) localized non-spreading impacts and 2) propagating impacts
resulting in irreversible and widespread damage.
Traditional decision-making strategies focus on the case
where harm is localized and risk is easy to calculate from
past data. Under these circumstances, cost-benefit analyses and
mitigation techniques are appropriate. The potential harm from
miscalculation is bounded.
On the other hand, the possibility of irreversible and
widespread damage raises different questions about the nature
of decision making and what risks can be reasonably taken.
This is the domain of the PP.
1The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development presents it as
follows: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation."
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Criticisms are often levied against those who argue for
caution portraying them as unreasonable and possibly even
paranoid. Those who raise such criticisms are implicitly or
explicitly advocating for a cost benefit analysis, and neces-
sarily so. Critics of the PP have also expressed concern that
it will be applied in an overreaching manner, eliminating the
ability to take reasonable risks that are needed for individual
or societal gains. While indiscriminate use of the PP might
constrain appropriate risk-taking, at the same time one can
also make the error of suspending the PP in cases when it is
vital.
Hence, a non-naive view of the precautionary principle is
one in which it is only invoked when necessary, and only to
prevent a certain variety of very precisely defined risks based
on distinctive probabilistic structures. But, also, in such a view,
the PP should never be omitted when needed.
The remainder of this section will outline the difference
between the naive and non-naive approaches.
A. What we mean by a non-naive PP
Risk aversion and risk-seeking are both well-studied human
behaviors. However, it is essential to distinguish the PP so
that it is neither used naively to justify any act of caution, nor
dismissed by those who wish to court risks for themselves or
others.
The PP is intended to make decisions that ensure survival
when statistical evidence is limited—because it has not had
time to show up —by focusing on the adverse effects of
"absence of evidence."
Table 1 encapsulates the central idea of the paper and shows
the differences between decisions with a risk of harm (warrant-
ing regular risk management techniques) and decisions with a
risk of total ruin (warranting the PP).
Standard Risk Management Precautionary Approach
localized harm systemic ruin
nuanced cost-benefit avoid at all costs
statistical fragility based
statistical probabilistic non-statistical
variations ruin
convergent probabibilities divergent probabilities
recoverable irreversible
independent factors interconnected factors
evidence based precautionary
thin tails fat tails
bottom-up, tinkering top-down engineered
evolved human-made
TABLE I: Two different types of risk and their respective
characteristics compared
B. Harm vs. Ruin: When the PP is necessary
The purpose of the PP is to avoid a certain class of what,
in probability and insurance, is called “ruin" problems [1]. A
ruin problem is one where outcomes of risks have a non-zero
probability of resulting in unrecoverable losses. An often-cited
illustrative case is that of a gambler who loses his entire for-
tune and so cannot return to the game. In biology, an example
would be a species that has gone extinct. For nature, "ruin"
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Fig. 1: Why Ruin is not a Renewable Resource. No matter
how small the probability, in time, something bound to hit the
ruin barrier is about guaranteed to hit it.
is ecocide: an irreversible termination of life at some scale,
which could be planetwide. The large majority of variations
that occur within a system, even drastic ones, fundamentally
differ from ruin problems: a system that achieves ruin cannot
recover. As long as the instance is bounded, e.g. a gambler can
work to gain additional resources, there may be some hope of
reversing the misfortune. This is not the case when it is global.
Our concern is with public policy. While an individual may
be advised to not "bet the farm," whether or not he does so
is generally a matter of individual preferences. Policy makers
have a responsibility to avoid catastrophic harm for society
as a whole; the focus is on the aggregate, not at the level of
single individuals, and on global-systemic, not idiosyncratic,
harm. This is the domain of collective "ruin" problems.
Precautionary considerations are relevant much more
broadly than to ruin problems. For example, there was a
precautionary case against cigarettes long before there was an
open-and-shut evidence-based case against them. Our point
is that the PP is a decisive consideration for ruin problems,
while in a broader context precaution is not decisive and can
be balanced against other considerations.
III. WHY RUIN IS SERIOUS BUSINESS
The risk of ruin is not sustainable. By the ruin theorems, if
you incur a tiny probability of ruin as a "one-off" risk, survive
it, then do it again (another "one-off" deal), you will eventually
go bust with probability 1. Confusion arises because it may
seem that the "one-off" risk is reasonable, but that also means
that an additional one is reasonable. This can be quantified by
recognizing that the probability of ruin approaches 1 as the
number of exposures to individually small risks, say one in
ten thousand, increases (see Fig. 1). For this reason a strategy
of risk taking is not sustainable and we must consider any
genuine risk of total ruin as if it were inevitable.
The good news is that some classes of risk can be deemed
to be practically of probability zero: the earth survived trillions
of natural variations daily over 3 billion years, otherwise we
would not be here. By recognizing that normal risks are not
in the category of ruin problems, we recognize also that it
is not necessary or even normal to take risks that involve a
possibility of ruin.
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A. PP is not Risk Management
It is important to contrast and not conflate the PP and
risk management. Risk management involves various strategies
to make decisions based upon accounting for the effects of
positive and negative outcomes and their probabilities, as
well as seeking means to mitigate harm and offset losses.
Risk management strategies are important for decision-making
when ruin is not at stake. However, the only risk management
strategy of importance in the case of the PP is ensuring that
actions which can result in ruin are not taken, or equivalently,
modifying potential choices of action so that ruin is not one
of the possible outcomes.
More generally, we can identify three layers associated
with strategies for dealing with uncertainty and risk. The first
layer is the PP which addresses cases that involve potential
global harm, whether probabilities are uncertain or known and
whether they are large or small. The second is risk manage-
ment which addresses the case of known probabilities of well-
defined, bounded gains and losses. The third is risk aversion or
risk-seeking behavior, which reflects quite generally the role
of personal preferences for individual risks when uncertainty
is present.
Absorbing 
Barrier
20 40 60 80 100
Time
State
Fig. 2: A variety of temporal states for a process subjected
to an absorbing barrier. Once the absorbing barrier is hit, the
process terminates, regardless of its future potential.
B. Ruin is forever
A way to formalize the ruin problem in terms of the
destructive consequences of actions identifies harm as not
about the amount of destruction, but rather a measure of the
integrated level of destruction over the time it persists. When
the impact of harm extends to all future times, i.e. forever, then
the harm is infinite. When the harm is infinite, the product
of any non-zero probability and the harm is also infinite,
and it cannot be balanced against any potential gains, which
are necessarily finite. This strategy for evaluation of harm as
involving the duration of destruction can be used for localized
harms for better assessment in risk management. Our focus
here is on the case where destruction is complete for a system
or an irreplaceable aspect of a system.
Figure 2 shows ruin as an absorbing barrier, a point that
does not allow recovery.
For example, for humanity global devastation cannot be
measured on a scale in which harm is proportional to level of
devastation. The harm due to complete destruction is not the
same as 10 times the destruction of 1/10 of the system. As the
percentage of destruction approaches 100%, the assessment of
harm diverges to infinity (instead of converging to a particular
number) due to the value placed on a future that ceases to
exist.
Because the “cost” of ruin is effectively infinite, cost-benefit
analysis (in which the potential harm and potential gain are
multiplied by their probabilities and weighed against each
other) is no longer a useful paradigm. Even if probabilities
are expected to be zero but have a non-zero uncertainty,
then a sensitivity analysis that considers the impact of that
uncertainty results in infinities as well. The potential harm is
so substantial that everything else in the equation ceases to
matter. In this case, we must do everything we can to avoid
the catastrophe.
IV. SCIENTIFIC METHODS AND THE PP
How well can we know either the potential consequences
of policies or their probabilities? What does science say about
uncertainty? To be helpful in policy decisions, science has to
encompass not just expectations of potential benefit and harm
but also their probability and uncertainty.
Just as the imperative of analysis of decision-making
changes when there is infinite harm for a small, non-zero
risk, so is there a fundamental change in the ability to
apply scientific methods to the evaluation of that harm. This
influences the way we evaluate both the possibility of and the
risk associated with ruin.
The idea of precaution is the avoidance of adverse con-
sequences. This is qualitatively different from the idea of
evidentiary action (from statistics). In the case of the PP,
evidence may come too late. The non-naive PP bridges the gap
between precaution and evidentiary action using the ability to
evaluate the difference between local and global risks.
A. Precautionary vs. Evidentiary Action
Statistical-evidentiary approaches to risk analysis and mit-
igation count the frequency of past events (robust statistics),
or calibrate parameters of statistical distributions to generate
probabilities of future events (parametric approach), or both.
Experimental evidentiary methods follow the model of medical
trials, computing probabilities of harm from side effects of
drugs or interventions by observing the reactions in a variety of
animal and human models. Generally they assume that the risk
itself (i.e. nature of harm and their probability) is adequately
determined by available information. However, the level of
risk may be hard to gauge as its probability may be uncertain,
and, in the case of potential infinite harm, an uncertainty that
allows for a non-zero probability results in infinities so that
the problem is ill-defined mathematically.
While evidentiary approaches are often considered to reflect
adherence to the scientific method in its purest form, it is
apparent that these approaches do not apply to ruin problems.
In an evidentiary approach to risk (relying on evidence-based
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methods), the existence of a risk or harm occurs when we
experience that risk or harm. In the case of ruin, by the time
evidence comes it will by definition be too late to avoid it.
Nothing in the past may predict one fatal event as illustrated
in Fig. 4. Thus standard evidence-based approaches cannot
work.
More generally, evidentiary action is a framework based
upon the quite reasonable expectation that we learn from
experience. The idea of evidentiary action is embodied in
the kind of learning from experience that is found in how
people often react to disasters—after the fact. When a disaster
occurs people prepare for the next one, but do not anticipate
it in advance. For the case of ruin problems, such behavior
guarantees extinction.
B. Invalid Empirical Arguments Against Ruin
In the case of arguments about ruin problems, claims that
experience thus far has not provided evidence for ruin, and
thus it should not be considered, are not valid.
C. Unknowability, Uncertainty and Unpredictability
It has been shown that the complexity of real world systems
limits the ability of empirical observations to determine the
outcomes of actions upon them [2]. This means that a certain
class of systemic risks will remain inherently unknown. In
some classes of complex systems, controlled experiments
cannot evaluate all of the possible systemic consequences
under real-world conditions. In these circumstances, efforts
to provide assurance of the "lack of harm" are insufficiently
reliable. This runs counter to both the use of empirical ap-
proaches (including controlled experiments) to evaluate risks,
and to the expectation that uncertainty can be eliminated by
any means.
D. Distinguishing Global and Local Risks
Since there are mathematical limitations to predictability of
outcomes in a complex system, the central issue to determine is
whether the threat of harm is local (hence globally benign) or
carries global consequences. Scientific analysis can robustly
determine whether a risk is systemic, i.e. by evaluating the
connectivity of the system to propagation of harm, without
determining the specifics of such a risk. If the consequences
are systemic, the associated uncertainty of risks must be
treated differently than if it is not. In such cases, precautionary
action is not based on direct empirical evidence but on
analytical approaches based upon the theoretical understanding
of the nature of harm. It relies on probability theory without
computing probabilities. The essential question is whether or
not global harm is possible or not. Theory enables generalizing
from experience in order to apply it to new circumstances. In
the case of the PP, the existence of a robust way to generalize
is essential.
The relevance of the precautionary principle today is greater
than in the past, owing to the global connectivity of civilization
that makes the spreading of effects to places previously
insulated.
Fig. 3: Thin Tails from Tinkering, Bottom-Up, Evolution. In
nature no individual variation represents a large share of the
sum of the variations. Natural boundaries prevent cascading
effects from propagating globally. Mass extinctions arise from
the rare cases where large impacts (meteorite hits and vulcan-
ism) propagate across the globe through the atmosphere and
oceans.
Fig. 4: Fat Tails from a Top-Down, Engineered Design In
human made variations the tightly connected global system
implies a single deviation will eventually dominate the sum
of their effects. Examples include pandemics, invasive species,
financial crises and monoculture.
V. FAT TAILS AND FRAGILITY
A. Thin and Fat Tails
To figure out whether a given decision involves the risk
of ruin and thus warrants the use of the PP, we must first
understand the relevant underlying probabilistic structures.
There are two classes of probability distributions of events:
one in which events are accompanied by well behaved, mild
variations (e.g. Gaussian or thin tails), and the other where
small probabilities are associated with large variations that
have no characteristic scale (e.g. power law or fat tails). Alle-
gorically these are illustrated by Mediocristan and Extremistan
(Figs. 3 and 4), the former being typical of human weight dis-
tributions, and the latter of human wealth distributions. Given
a series of events (a sequence of measurements of weight or
wealth), in the case of thin tails the sum is proportional to
the average, and in the case of fat tails a sum over them may
be entirely dominated by a single one. Thus, while no human
being can be heavier than, say, ten average adults (since weight
is thin-tailed), a single individual can be richer than the poorest
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two billion humans (since wealth is fat tailed).
In thin tailed domains (Fig 3) harm comes from the col-
lective effect of many, many events; no event alone can be
consequential enough to affect the aggregate. It is practically
impossible for a single day to account for 99% of all heart
attacks in a given year (the probability is small enough to be
practically zero), for an illustration). Statistical distributions
that belong to the thin-tailed domain include: Gaussian, Bino-
mial, Bernoulli, Poisson, Gamma, Beta and Exponential.
In fat tailed domains of risk (Fig. 4) harm comes from the
largest single event. Examples of relevant statistical distribu-
tions include: Pareto, Levy-Stable distributions with infinite
variance, Cauchy, and power law distributions, especially with
larger exponents.
B. Why interdependence brings fat tails
When variations lead to independent impacts locally, the
aggregate effect of those variations is small according to the
central limit theorem, guaranteeing thin-tailed distributions.
When there is interdependence, the central limit theorem does
not apply, and aggregate variations may become much more
severe due to mutual reinforcement. Interdependence arises
because of the coupling of behavior in different places. Under
these conditions, cascades propagate through the system in
a way that can cause large impacts. Whether components
are independent or dependent clearly matters to systemic
disasters such as pandemics and financial or other crises.
Interdependence increases the probability of ruin, ultimately
to the point of certainty.
Consider the global financial crash of 2008. As financial
firms became increasingly interdependent during the latter part
of the 20th century, small fluctuations during periods of calm
masked the vulnerability of the system to cascading failures.
Instead of a local shock in an independent area of the system,
we experienced a global shock with cascading effects. The
crisis of 2008, in addition, illustrates the failure of evidentiary
risk management. Since data from the time series beginning in
the 1980s exhibited stability, causing the period to be dubbed
"the great moderation," it deceived those relying on historical
statistical evidence.
VI. WHAT IS THE RISK OF HARM TO THE EARTH?
At the systemic largest scale on Earth, nature has thin
tails, though tails may be fat at smaller length scales or
sufficiently long time scales; occasional mass extinctions occur
at very long time scales. This is characteristic of a bottom-up,
local tinkering design process, where things change primarily
locally and only mildly and iteratively on a global scale.
In recent years, it has been shown that natural systems
often have fat tail (power law) behaviors associated with the
propagation of shocks [3]. This, however, applies to selected
systems that do not have barriers (or circuit-breakers) that limit
those propagations. The earth has an intrinsic heterogeneity
of oceans/continents, deserts, mountains, lakes, rivers and
climate differences that limit the propagation of variations
from one area to another. There are also smaller natural
boundaries associated with organism sizes and those of local
groups of organisms. Among the largest propagation events we
commonly observe are forest fires, but even these are bounded
in their impacts compared to a global scale. The various forms
of barriers limit the propagation of cascades that enable large
scale events.
At longer time scales of millions of years, mass extinctions
can achieve a global scale. Connectivity of oceans and the at-
mosphere enables propagation of impacts, i.e. gas, ash and dust
propagating through the atmosphere due to meteor impacts
and volcanism, is considered a scenario for these extinction
events [4]. The variability associated with mass extinctions
can especially be seen in the fossil record of marine animal
species; those of plants and land insects are comparatively
robust. It is not known to what extent these events are driven
extrinsically, by meteor impacts, geological events including
volcanos, or cascading events of coupled species extinctions,
or combinations of them. The variability associated with mass
extinctions, however, indicates that there are fat tail events that
can affect the global biosphere. The major extinction events
during the past 500 million years occur at intervals of millions
of years [5]. While mass extinctions occur, the extent of that
vulnerability is driven by both sensitivity to external events
and connectivity among ecosystems.
The greatest impact of human beings on this natural system
connectivity is through dramatic increases in global transporta-
tion. The impact of invasive species and rapid global trans-
mission of diseases demonstrates the role of human activity
in connecting previously much more isolated natural systems.
The role of transportation and communication in connecting
civilization itself is apparent in economic interdependence
manifest in cascading financial crises that were not possible
even a hundred years ago. The danger we are facing today is
that we as a civilization are globally connected, and the fat
tail of the distribution of shocks extends globally, to our peril.
Had nature not imposed sufficiently thin-tailed variations in
the aggregate or macro level, we would not be here today. A
single one of the trillions, perhaps the trillions of trillions, of
variations over evolutionary history would have terminated life
on the planet. Figures 1 and 2 show the difference between the
two separate statistical properties. While tails can be fat for
subsystems, nature remains predominantly thin-tailed at the
level of the planet [6]. As connectivity increases the risk of
extinction increases dramatically and nonlinearly [7].
A. Risk and Global Interventionism
Currently, global dependencies are manifest in the expressed
concerns about policy maker actions that nominally appear to
be local in their scope. In just recent months, headlines have
been about Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, the spread of
Ebola in east Africa, expansion of ISIS control into Iraq, ongo-
ing posturing in North Korea and Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
among others. These events reflect upon local policy maker
decisions that are justifiably viewed as having global reper-
cussions. The connection between local actions and global
risks compels widespread concern and global responses to
alter or mitigate local actions. In this context, we point out
that the broader significance and risk associated with policy
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Fig. 5: Nonlinear response compared to linear response.
The PP should be evoked to prevent impacts that result in
complete destruction due to the nonlinear response of natural
systems, it is not needed for smaller impacts where risk
management methods can be applied.
actions that impact on global ecological and human survival is
the essential point of the PP. Paying attention to the headline
events without paying attention to these even larger risks is like
being concerned about the wine being served on the Titanic.
VII. FRAGILITY
We define fragility in the technical discussion in Appendix
C as "is harmed by uncertainty", with the mathematical result
that what is harmed by uncertainty has a certain type on
nonlinear response to random events.
The PP applies only to the largest scale impacts due to the
inherent fragility of systems that maintain their structure. As
the scale of impacts increases the harm increases non-linearly
up to the point of destruction.
A. Fragility as Nonlinear Response
Everything that has survived is necessarily non-linear to
harm. If I fall from a height of 10 meters I am injured more
than 10 times than if I fell from a height of 1 meter, or more
than 1000 times than if I fell from a height of 1 centimeter,
hence I am fragile. In general, every additional meter, up to
the point of my destruction, hurts me more than the previous
one.
Similarly, if I am hit with a big stone I will be harmed a lot
more than if I were pelted serially with pebbles of the same
total weight.
Everything that is fragile and still in existence (that is,
unbroken), will be harmed more by a certain stressor of
intensity X than by k times a stressor of intensity X/k, up to
the point of breaking. If I were not fragile (susceptible to harm
more than linearly), I would be destroyed by accumulated
effects of small events, and thus would not survive. This non-
linear response is central for everything on planet earth.
This explains the necessity of considering scale when in-
voking the PP. Polluting in a small way does not warrant the
PP because it is essentially less harmful than polluting in large
quantities, since harm is non-linear.
B. Why is fragility a general rule?
The statistical structure of stressors is such that small
variations are much, much more frequent than large ones.
Fragility is intimately connected to the ability to withstand
small impacts and recover from them. This ability is what
makes a system retain its structure. Every system has a
threshold of impact beyond which it will be destroyed, i.e.
its structure is not sustained.
Consider a coffee cup sitting on a table: there are millions
of recorded earthquakes every year; if the coffee cup were
linearly sensitive to earthquakes and accumulated their effects
as small deteriorations of its form, it would not persist even
for a short time as it would have been broken down due to
the accumulated impact of small vibrations. The coffee cup,
however, is non-linear to harm, so that the small or remote
earthquakes only make it wobble, whereas one large one would
break it forever.
This nonlinearity is necessarily present in everything fragile.
Thus, when impacts extend to the size of the system, harm
is severely exacerbated by non-linear effects. Small impacts,
below a threshold of recovery, do not accumulate for systems
that retain their structure. Larger impacts cause irreversible
damage. We should be careful, however, of actions that may
seem small and local but then lead to systemic consequences.
C. Fragility, Dose response and the 1/n rule
Another area where we see non-linear responses to harm is
the dose-response relationship. As the dose of some chemical
or stressor increases, the response to it grows non-linearly.
Many low-dose exposures do not cause great harm, but a single
large-dose can cause irreversible damage to the system, like
overdosing on painkillers.
In decision theory, the 1/n heuristic is a simple rule in
which an agent invests equally across n funds (or sources
of risk) rather than weighting their investments according to
some optimization criterion such as mean-variance or Modern
Portfolio Theory (MPT), which dictates some amount of
concentration in order to increase the potential payoff. The
1/n heuristic mitigates the risk of suffering ruin due to an error
in the model; there is no single asset whose failure can bring
down the ship. While the potential upside of the large payoff
is dampened, ruin due to an error in prediction is avoided.
This heuristic works best when the sources of variations are
uncorrelated and, in the presence of correlation or dependence
between the various sources of risk, the total exposure needs
to be reduced.
Hence, because of non-linearities, it is preferable to diver-
sify our effect on the planet, e.g. distinct types of pollutants,
across the broadest number of uncorrelated sources of harm,
rather than concentrate them. In this way, we avoid the risk
of an unforeseen, disproportionately harmful response to a
pollutant deemed "safe" by virtue of responses observed only
in relatively small doses.
Table II summarizes out policy with respect to the various
types of exposures and fragilities.
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TABLE II: The Four Quadrants
Local Exposure Systemic Exposure
Thin Tails I II
Fat Tails III IV: Domain of PP
I: First Quadrant, safe
II: Second Quadrant, safe but calculated risks
III: Quadrant III, safe but rigorous risk management
IV: Quadrant Where PP should be exercized
VIII. THE LIMITATION OF TOP-DOWN ENGINEERING IN
COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
In considering the limitations of risk-taking, a key question
is whether or not we can analyze the potential outcomes
of interventions and, knowing them, identify the associated
risks. Can’t we just "figure it out?” With such knowledge
we can gain assurance that extreme problems such as global
destruction will not arise.
Since the same issue arises for any engineering effort, we
can ask what is the state-of-the-art of engineering? Does it
enable us to know the risks we will encounter? Perhaps it
can just determine the actions we should, or should not, take.
There is justifiably widespread respect for engineering because
it has provided us with innovations ranging from infrastructure
to electronics that have become essential to modern life.
What is not as well known by the scientific community and
the public, is that engineering approaches fail in the face
of complex challenges and this failure has been extensively
documented by the engineering community itself [8]. The
underlying reason for the failure is that complex environments
present a wide range of conditions. Which conditions will
actually be encountered is uncertain. Engineering approaches
involve planning that requires knowledge of the conditions
that will be encountered. Planning fails due to the inability to
anticipate the many conditions that will arise.
This problem arises particularly for “real-time” systems that
are dealing with large amounts of information and have critical
functions in which lives are at risk. A classic example is
the air traffic control system. An effort to modernize that
system by traditional engineering methods cost $3-6 billion
and was abandoned without changing any part of the system
because of the inability to evaluate the risks associated with
its implementation.
Significantly, the failure of traditional engineering to address
complex challenges has led to the adoption of innovation
strategies that mirror evolutionary processes, creating plat-
forms and rules that can serve as a basis for safely introducing
small incremental changes that are extensively tested in their
real world context [8]. This strategy underlies the approach
used by highly-successful, modern, engineered-evolved, com-
plex systems ranging from the Internet, to Wikipedia, to
iPhone App communities.
Low model 
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High model 
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Ruin
Ruin 
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Fig. 6: The more uncertain or skeptical one is of "scientific"
models and projections, the higher the risk of ruin, which flies
in the face of the argument of the style "skeptical of climate
models". No matter how increased the probability of benefits,
ruin as an absorbing barrier, i.e. causing extinction without
further recovery, can more than cancels them out. This graph
assumes changes in uncertainty without changes in benefits (a
mean-preserving sensitivity) –the next one isolates the changes
in benefits.
Fig. 7: The graph shows the asymmetry between benefits and
harm and the effect on the ruin probabilities. Shows the effect
on ruin probability of changes the Information Ratio, that is,
expected benefit
uncertainty (or signal divided by noise). Benefits are small
compared to negative effects. Three cases are considered, two
from Extremistan: extremely fat-tailed (α = 1), and less fat-
tailed (α = 2), and one from Mediocristan.
IX. SKEPTICISM AND PRECAUTION
We show in Figures 6 and 7 that an increase in uncer-
tainty leads to an increase in the probability of ruin, hence
"skepticism" is that its impact on decisions should lead to
increased, not decreased conservatism in the presence of ruin.
More skepticism about models implies more uncertainty about
the tails, which necessitates more precaution about newly
implemented techniques, or larger size of exposures. As we
said, Nature might not be smart, but its longer track record
means smaller uncertainty in following its logic.
Mathematically, more uncertainty about the future –or about
a model –increases the scale of the distribution, hence thickens
the "left tail" (as well as the "right one") which raises the
potential ruin. The survival probability is reduced no matter
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what takes place in the right tail. Hence skepticim about
climate models should lead to more precautionary policies.
In addition, such increase uncertainty matters far more in
Extremistan –and has benign effects in Mediocristan. Figure 7
shows th asymmetries between costs and benefits as far as ruin
probabilities, and why these matter more for fat-tailed domains
than thin-tailed ones. In thin-tailed domains, an increase in
uncertainty changes the probability of ruin by several orders
of magnitude, but the effect remains small: from say 10−40 to
10−30 is not quite worrisome. In fat-tailed domains, the effect
is sizeable as we start with a substantially higher probability
of ruin (which is typically underestimated, see [6]).
X. WHY SHOULD GMOS BE UNDER PP BUT NOT
NUCLEAR ENERGY?
As examples that are relevant to the discussion of the dif-
ferent types of strategies, we consider the differences between
concerns about nuclear energy and GM crops.
In short nuclear exposure in nonlinear –and can be local
(under some conditions) – while GMOs are not and present
systemic risks even in small amounts.
A. Nuclear energy
Many are justifiably concerned about nuclear energy. It is
known that the potential harm due to radiation release, core
meltdowns and waste can be large. At the same time, the nature
of these risks has been extensively studied, and the risks from
local uses of nuclear energy have a scale that is much smaller
than global. Thus, even though some uncertainties remain, it is
possible to formulate a cost benefit analysis of risks for local
decision-making. The large potential harm at a local scale
means that decisions about whether, how and how much to
use nuclear energy, and what safety measures to use, should be
made carefully so that decision makers and the public can rely
upon them. Risk management is a very serious matter when
potential harm can be large and should not be done casually
or superficially. Those who perform the analysis must not only
do it carefully, they must have the trust of others that they are
doing it carefully. Nevertheless, the known statistical structure
of the risks and the absence of global systemic consequences
makes the cost benefit analysis meaningful. Decisions can
be made in the cost-benefit context—evoking the PP is not
appropriate for small amounts of nuclear energy, as the local
nature of the risks is not indicative of the circumstances to
which the PP applies.
In large quantities, we should worry about an unseen risk
from nuclear energy and invoke the PP. In small quantities,
it may be OK—how small we should determine by direct
analysis, making sure threats never cease to be local.
In addition to the risks from nuclear energy use itself,
we must keep in mind the longer term risks associated with
the storage of nuclear waste, which are compounded by the
extended length of time they remain hazardous. The problems
of such longer term “lifecycle” effects is present in many
different industries. It arises not just for nuclear energy but
also for fossil fuels and other sources of pollution, though the
sheer duration of toxicity effects for nuclear waste, enduring
Fig. 8: A simplified illustration of the mechanism behind the
potato famine of the 19th C. showing how concentration from
monoculture increases the risk of ruin. Inspired by Berkeley’s
Understanding Evolution.
for hundreds of thousands of years in some cases, makes this
problem particularly intense for nuclear power.
As we saw earlier we need to remain careful in limiting
nuclear exposure –as other sources of pollution – to sources
that owing to their quantity do not allow for systemic effects.
B. GMOs
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and their risk are
currently the subject of debate [9]. Here we argue that they
fall squarely under the PP because their risk is systemic. There
are two aspects of systemic risk, the widespread impact on the
ecosystem and the widespread impact on health.
Ecologically, in addition to intentional cultivation, GMOs
have the propensity to spread uncontrollably, and thus their
risks cannot be localized. The cross-breeding of wild-type
plants with genetically modified ones prevents their disen-
tangling, leading to irreversible system-wide effects with un-
known downsides. The ecological implications of releasing
modified organisms into the wild are not tested empirically
before release.
Healthwise, the modification of crops impacts everyone.
Corn, one of the primary GMO crops, is not only eaten fresh
or as cereals, but is also a major component of processed foods
in the form of high-fructose corn syrup, corn oil, corn starch
and corn meal. In 2014 in the US almost 90% of corn and
94% of soybeans are GMO [11]. Foods derived from GMOs
are not tested in humans before they are marketed.
The widespread impacts of GMOs on ecologies and human
health imply they are in the domain of the PP. This should
itself compel policy makers to take extreme caution. However,
there is a difficulty for many in understanding the abstract
nature of the engagement in risks and imagining the many
possible ways that harm can be caused. Thus, we summarize
further the nature of the risks that are involved.
C. GMOs in detail
The systemic global impacts of GMOs arise from a
combination of (1) engineered genetic modifications, (2)
monoculture—the use of single crops over large areas. Global
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monoculture itself is of concern for potential global harm, but
the evolutionary context of traditional crops provides important
assurances (see Figure 8). Invasive species are frequently a
problem but one might at least argue that the long term evolu-
tionary testing of harmful impacts of organisms on local eco-
logical systems mitigates if not eliminates the largest potential
risks. Monoculture in combination with genetic engineering
dramatically increases the risks being taken. Instead of a long
history of evolutionary selection, these modifications rely not
just on naive engineering strategies that do not appropriately
consider risk in complex environments, but also explicitly
reductionist approaches that ignore unintended consequences
and employ very limited empirical testing.
Ironically, at a time when engineering is adopting evolu-
tionary approaches due to the failure of top-down strategies,
biologists and agronomists are adopting top-down engineering
strategies and taking global systemic risks in introducing
organisms into the wild.
One argument in favor of GMOs is that they are no more
"unnatural" than the selective farming our ancestors have been
doing for generations. In fact, the ideas developed in this
paper show that this is not the case. Selective breeding over
human history is a process in which change still happens in a
bottom-up way, and can be expected to result in a thin-tailed
distribution. If there is a mistake, some harmful variation,
it will not spread throughout the whole system but end up
dying out due to local experience over time. Human experience
over generations has chosen the biological organisms that are
relatively safe for consumption. There are many that are not,
including parts of and varieties of the crops we do cultivate
[12]. Introducing rapid changes in organisms is inconsistent
with this process. There is a limited rate at which variations
can be introduced and selection will be effective [13].
There is no comparison between tinkering with the selec-
tive breeding of genetic components of organisms that have
previously undergone extensive histories of selection and the
top-down engineering of taking a gene from a fish and putting
it into a tomato. Saying that such a product is natural misses
the process of natural selection by which things become
“natural." While there are claims that all organisms include
transgenic materials, those genetic transfers that are currently
present were subject to selection over long times and survived.
The success rate is tiny. Unlike GMOs, in nature there is
no immediate replication of mutated organisms to become
a large fraction of the organisms of a species. Indeed, any
one genetic variation is unlikely to become part of the long
term genetic pool of the population. Instead, just like any
other genetic variation or mutation, transgenic transfers are
subject to competition and selection over many generations
before becoming a significant part of the population. A new
genetic transfer engineered today is not the same as one that
has survived this process of selection.
An example of the effect of transfer of biologically evolved
systems to a different context is that of zoonotic diseases.
Even though pathogens consume their hosts, they evolve to
be less harmful than they would otherwise be. Pathogens that
cause highly lethal diseases are selected against because their
hosts die before they are able to transmit to others. This is
the underlying reason for the greater dangers associated with
zoonotic diseases—caused by pathogens that shift from the
host that they evolved in to human beings, including HIV,
Avian and Swine flu that transferred from monkeys (through
chimpanzees), birds and hogs, respectively.
More generally, engineered modifications to ecological sys-
tems (through GMOs) are categorically and statistically dif-
ferent from bottom up ones. Bottom-up modifications do not
remove the crops from their long term evolutionary context,
enabling the push and pull of the ecosystem to locally extin-
guish harmful mutations. Top-down modifications that bypass
this evolutionary pathway unintentionally manipulate large sets
of interdependent factors at the same time, with dramatic risks
of unintended consequences. They thus result in fat-tailed
distributions and place a huge risk on the food system as a
whole.
For the impact of GMOs on health, the evaluation of
whether the genetic engineering of a particular chemical
(protein) into a plant is OK by the FDA is based upon consid-
ering limited existing knowledge of risks associated with that
protein. The number of ways such an evaluation can be in error
is large. The genetic modifications are biologically significant
as the purpose is to strongly impact the chemical functions of
the plant, modifying its resistance to other chemicals such as
herbicides or pesticides, or affecting its own lethality to other
organisms—i.e. its antibiotic qualities. The limited existing
knowledge generally does not include long term testing of the
exposure of people to the added chemical, even in isolation.
The evaluation is independent of the ways the protein affects
the biochemistry of the plant, including interactions among
the various metabolic pathways and regulatory systems—
and the impact of the resulting changes in biochemistry on
health of consumers. The evaluation is independent of its
farm-ecosystem combination (i.e. pesticide resistant crops are
subject to increased use of pesticides, which are subsequently
present in the plant in larger concentrations and cannot be
washed away). Rather than recognizing the limitations of
current understanding, poorly grounded perspectives about the
potential damage with unjustified assumptions are being made.
Limited empirical validation of both essential aspects of the
conceptual framework as well as specific conclusions are being
used because testing is recognized to be difficult.
We should exert the precautionary principle here – our non-
naive version – because we do not want to discover errors
after considerable and irreversible environmental and health
damage.
D. Red herring: How about the risk of famine without GMOs?
An argument used by those who advocate for GMOs is that
they will reduce the hunger in the world. Invoking the risk of
famine as an alternative to GMOs is a deceitful strategy, no
different from urging people to play Russian roulette in order
to get out of poverty.
The evocation of famine also prevents clear thinking about
not just GMOs but also about global hunger. The idea that
GMO crops will help avert famine ignores evidence that
the problem of global hunger is due to poor economic and
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agricultural policies. Those who care about the supply of food
should advocate for an immediate impact on the problem by
reducing the amount of corn used for ethanol in the US, which
burns food for fuel consuming over 40% of the US crop that
could provide enough food to feed 2/3 of a billion people [14].
One of the most extensively debated cases for GMOs is
a variety of rice—"golden rice"—to which has been added
a precursor of vitamin A as a potential means to alleviate
this nutritional deficiency, which is a key medical condition
affecting impoverished populations. Since there are alterna-
tives, including traditional vitamin fortification, one approach
is to apply a cost benefit analysis comparing these approaches.
Counter to this approach stands both the largely unknown risks
associated with the introduction of GMOs, and the need and
opportunities for more systemic interventions to alleviate not
just malnutrition but poverty and hunger worldwide. While
great attention should be placed on immediate needs, neglect-
ing the larger scale risks is unreasonable [10]. Here science
should adopt an unyielding rigor for both health benefit and
risk assessment, including careful application of the PP. Absent
such rigor, advocacy by the scientific community not only fails
to be scientific, but also becomes subject to challenge for short
term interests, not much different from corporate endorsers.
Thus, cutting corners on tests, including tests without adequate
consent or approvals performed on Chinese children [15],
undermines scientific claims to humanitarian ideals. Given
the promotion of "golden rice" by the agribusiness that also
promote biofuels, their interest in humanitarian impacts versus
profits gained through wider acceptance of GMO technology
can be legitimately questioned [16].
We can frame the problem in our probabilistic argument
of Section IX. This asymmetry from adding another risk,
here a technology (with uncertainty attending some of its
outcomes), to solve a given risk (which can be solved by less
complicated means) are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. Model
error, or errors from the technology itself, i.e., its iatrogenics,
can turn a perceived "benefit" into a highly likely catastrophe,
simply because an error from, say, "golden rice" or some
such technology would have much worse outcomes than an
equivalent benefit. Most of the discussions on "saving the poor
from starvation" via GMOs miss the fundamental asymmetry
shown in 7.
E. GMOs in summary
In contrast to nuclear energy (which, as discussed in section
X-A above, may or may not fall under the PP, depending on
how and where (how widely) it is implemented), Genetically
Modified Organisms, GMOs, fall squarely under the PP be-
cause of their systemic risk. The understanding of the risks is
very limited and the scope of the impacts are global both due
to engineering approach replacing an evolutionary approach,
and due to the use of monoculture.
Labeling the GMO approach “scientific" betrays a very
poor—indeed warped—understanding of probabilistic payoffs
and risk management. A lack of observations of explicit harm
does not show absence of hidden risks. Current models of
complex systems only contain the subset of reality that is
accessible to the scientist. Nature is much richer than any
model of it. To expose an entire system to something whose
potential harm is not understood because extant models do
not predict a negative outcome is not justifiable; the relevant
variables may not have been adequately identified.
Given the limited oversight that is taking place on GMO
introductions in the US, and the global impact of those
introductions, we are precisely in the regime of the ruin
problem. A rational consumer should say: We do not wish
to pay—or have our descendants pay—for errors made by
executives of Monsanto, who are financially incentivized to
focus on quarterly profits rather than long term global impacts.
We should exert the precautionary principle—our non-naive
version—simply because we otherwise will discover errors
with large impacts only after considerable damage.
F. Vaccination, Antibiotics, and Other Exposures
Our position is that while one may argue that vaccination
is risky, or risky under some circumstances, it does not fall
under PP owing to the lack of systemic risk. The same applies
to such interventions as antibiotics, provided the scale remains
limited to the local.
XI. PRECAUTION AS POLICY AND NAIVE INTERVENTION
When there is a risk of ruin, obstructionism and policy
inaction are important strategies, impeding the rapid headlong
experimentation with global ruin by those with short-term,
self-centered incentives and perspectives. Two approaches for
policy action are well justified. In the first, actions that avoid
the inherent sensitivity of the system to propagation of harm
can be used to free the system to enable local decision-
making and exploration with only local harm. This involves
introducing boundaries, barriers and separations that inhibit
propagation of shocks, preventing ruin for overly connected
systems. In the second, where such boundaries don’t exist or
cannot be introduced due to other effects, there is a need for
actions that are adequately evaluated as to their global harm.
Scientific analysis of such actions, meticulously validated, is
needed to prevent small risks from causing ruin.
What is not justified, and dangerous, are actions that are
intended to prevent harm by additional intervention. The
reason is that indirect effects are likely to create precisely the
risks that one is intending to avoid.
When existing risks are perceived as having the potential
for ruin, it may be assumed that any preventive measure is
justified. There are at least two problems with such a per-
spective. First, localized harm is often mistaken for ruin, and
the PP is wrongly invoked where risk management techniques
should be employed. When a risk is not systemic, overreaction
will typically cause more harm than benefits, like undergoing
dangerous surgery to remove a benign growth. Second, even
if the threat of ruin is real, taking specific (positive) action
in order to ward off the perceived threat may introduce new
systemic risks. It is often wiser to reduce or remove activity
that is generating or supporting the threat and allow natural
variations to play out in localized ways.
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Preventive action should be limited to correcting situations
by removing threats via negativa in order to bring them back
in line with a statistical structure that avoids ruin. It is often
better to remove structure or allow natural variation to take
place rather than to add something additional to the system.
When one takes the opposite approach, taking specific
action designed to diminish some perceived threat, one is
almost guaranteed to induce unforeseen consequences. Even
when there appears to be a direct link from a specific action
to a specific preventive outcome, the web of causality extends
in complex ways with consequences that are far from the
intended goal. These unintended consequences may generate
new vulnerabilities or strengthen the harm one is hoping to
diminish. Thus, when possible, limiting fragilizing dependen-
cies is better than imposing additional structure that increases
the fragility of the system as a whole.
XII. FALLACIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST PP
In this section we respond to a variety of arguments that
have been made against the PP.
A. Crossing the road (the paralysis fallacy)
Many have countered the invocation of the PP with “nothing
is ever totally safe.” “I take risks crossing the road every day,
so according to you I should stay home in a state of paralysis.”
The answer is that we don’t cross the street blindfolded, we
use sensory information to mitigate risks and reduce exposure
to extreme shocks.
Even more importantly in the context of the PP, the probabil-
ity distribution of death from road accidents at the population
level is thin-tailed; I do not incur the risk of generalized human
extinction by crossing the street—a human life is bounded in
duration and its unavoidable termination is an inherent part of
the bio-social system [17]. The error of my crossing the street
at the wrong time and meeting an untimely demise in general
does not cause others to do the same; the error does not spread.
If anything, one might expect the opposite effect, that others in
the system benefit from my mistake by adapting their behavior
to avoid exposing themselves to similar risks. Equating risks a
person takes with his or her own life with risking the existence
of civilization is an inappropriate ego trip. In fact, the very idea
of the PP is to avoid such a frivolous focus.
The paralysis argument is often used to present the PP as
incompatible with progress. This is untrue: tinkering, bottom-
up progress where mistakes are bounded is how progress has
taken place in history. The non-naive PP simply asserts that
the risks we take as we innovate must not extend to the entire
system; local failure serves as information for improvement.
Global failure does not.
This fallacy illustrates the misunderstanding between sys-
temic and idiosyncratic risk in the literature. Individuals are
fragile and mortal. The idea of sustainability is to stike to
make systems as close to immortal as possible.
B. The Psychology of Risk and Thick Tailed Distributions
One concern about the utility of the PP is that its evocation
may become commonplace because of risk aversion. Is it true
that people overreact to small probabilities and the PP would
feed into human biases? While we have carefully identified
the scope of the domain of applicability of the PP, it is also
helpful to review the evidence of risk aversion, which we find
not to be based upon sound studies.
Certain empirical studies appear to support the existence
of a bias toward risk aversion, claiming evidence that people
choose to avoid risks that are beneficial, inconsistent with
cost-benefit analyses. The relevant experiments ask people
questions about single probability events, showing that people
overreact to small probabilities. However, those researchers
failed to include the consequences of the associated events
which humans underestimate. Thus, this empirical strategy
as a way of identifying effectiveness of response to risk is
fundamentally flawed [18].
The proper consideration of risk involves both probability
and consequence, which should be multiplied together. Con-
sequences in many domains have thick tails, i.e. much larger
consequences can arise than are considered in traditional sta-
tistical approaches. Overreacting to small probabilities is not
irrational when the effect is large, as the product of probability
and harm is larger than expected from the traditional treatment
of probability distributions.
C. The Loch Ness fallacy
Many have countered that we have no evidence that the
Loch Ness monster doesn’t exist, and, to take the argument of
evidence of absence being different from absence of evidence,
we should act as if the Loch Ness monster existed. The
argument is a corruption of the absence of evidence problem
and certainly not part of the PP.
The relevant question is whether the existence of the Loch
Ness monster has implications for decisions about actions that
are being taken. We are not considering a decision to swim
in the Loch Ness. If the Loch Ness monster did exist, there
would still be no reason to invoke the PP, as the harm he
might cause is limited in scope to Loch Ness itself, and does
not present the risk of ruin.
D. The fallacy of misusing the naturalistic fallacy
Some people invoke “the naturalistic fallacy,” a philosoph-
ical concept that is limited to the moral domain. According
to this critique, we should not claim that natural things are
necessarily good; human innovation can be equally valid. We
do not claim to use nature to derive a notion of how things
"ought" to be organized. Rather, as scientists, we respect
nature for the extent of its experimentation. The high level
of statistical significance given by a very large sample cannot
be ignored. Nature may not have arrived at the best solution
to a problem we consider important, but there is reason to
believe that it is smarter than our technology based only on
statistical significance.
The question about what kinds of systems work (as demon-
strated by nature) is different than the question about what
working systems ought to do. We can take a lesson from
nature—and time—about what kinds of organizations are
robust against, or even benefit from, shocks, and in that
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sense systems should be structured in ways that allow them
to function. Conversely, we cannot derive the structure of a
functioning system from what we believe the outcomes ought
to be.
To take one example, Cass Sunstein—who has written
an article critical of the PP [19]—claims that there is a
"false belief that nature is benign." However, his conceptual
discussion fails to distinguish between thin and fat tails, local
harm and global ruin. The method of analysis misses both
the statistical significance of nature and the fact that it is
not necessary to believe in the perfection of nature, or in
its "benign" attributes, but rather in its track record, its sheer
statistical power as a risk evaluator and as a risk manager in
avoiding ruin.
E. The "Butterfly in China" fallacy
The statement “if I move my finger to scratch my nose,
by the butterfly-in-China effect, owing to non-linearities, I
may terminate life on earth," is known to be flawed. The
explanation is not widely understood. The fundamental reason
arises because of the existence of a wide range in levels of
predictability and the presence of a large number of fine scale
degrees of freedom for every large scale one [20]. Thus, the
traditional deterministic chaos, for which the butterfly effect
was named, applies specifically to low dimensional systems
with a few variables in a particular regime. High dimensional
systems, like the earth, have large numbers of fine scale
variables for every large scale one. Thus, it is apparent that not
all butterfly wing flaps can cause hurricanes. It is not clear that
any one of them can, and, if small perturbations can influence
large scale events, it happens only under specific conditions
where amplification occurs.
Empirically, our thesis rebuts the butterfly fallacy with
the argument that, in the aggregate, nature has experienced
trillions of small variations and yet it survives. Therefore, we
know that the effects of scratching one’s nose fall into the
thin tailed domain and thus do not warrant the precautionary
principle.
As described previously, barriers in natural systems lead
to subsystems having a high-degree of independence. Under-
standing how modern systems with a high-degree of connectiv-
ity have cascading effects is essential for understanding when
it is and isn’t appropriate to use the PP.
F. The potato fallacy
Many species were abruptly introduced into the Old World
starting in the 16th Century that did not cause environmen-
tal disasters (perhaps aside from diseases affecting Native
Americans). Some use this observation in defense of GMOs.
However, the argument is fallacious at two levels:
First, by the fragility argument, potatoes, tomatoes and
similar "New World" goods were developed locally through
progressive, bottom-up tinkering in a complex system in the
context of its interactions with its environment. Had they
had an impact on the environment, it would have caused ad-
verse consequences that would have prevented their continual
spread.
Second, a counterexample is not evidence in the risk do-
main, particularly when the evidence is that taking a similar
action previously did not lead to ruin. Lack of ruin due to
several or even many trials does not indicate safety from
ruin in the next one. This is also the Russian roulette fallacy,
detailed below.
G. The Russian roulette fallacy (the counterexamples in the
risk domain)
The potato example, assuming potatoes had not been gener-
ated top-down by some engineers, would still not be sufficient.
Nobody says "look, the other day there was no war, so we
don’t need an army," as we know better in real-life domains.
Nobody argues that a giant Russian roulette with many barrels
is "safe" and a great money making opportunity because it
didn’t blow up someone’s brains last time.
There are many reasons a previous action may not have led
to ruin while still having the potential to do so. If you attempt
to cross the street with a blindfold and earmuffs on, you may
make it across, but this is not evidence that such an action
carries no risk.
More generally, one needs a large sample for claims of
absence of risk in the presence of a small probability of ruin,
while a single “n = 1" example would be sufficient to counter
the claims of safety—this is the Black Swan argument [29].
Simply put, systemic modifications require a very long history
in order for the evidence of lack of harm to carry any weight.
H. The Carpenter Fallacy
Risk managers skeptical of the understanding of risk of
biological processes, such as GMOs, by the experts are
sometimes asked "are you a biologist?" But nobody asks a
probabilist dealing with roulette sequences if he is a carpenter.
To understand the gambler’s ruin problem by roulette betting,
we know to ask a probabilist, not a carpenter. No amount
of expertise in carpentry can replace rigor in understanding
the properties of long sequences of small probability bets.
Likewise, no amount of expertise in the details of biological
processes can be a substitute for probabilistic rigor.
The context for evaluating risk is the extent of knowledge
or lack of knowledge. Thus, when considering GMO risks,
a key question is what is the extent to which we know
the impacts of genetic changes in organisms. Claims that
geneticists know these consequences as a basis for GMOs do
not recognize either that their knowledge is not complete in its
own domain nor is genetics complete as a body of knowledge.
Geneticists do not know the developmental, physiological,
medical, cognitive and environmental consequences of genetic
changes in organisms. Indeed, most of these are not part
of their training or competency. Neither are they trained in
recognizing the impact of the limitations of knowledge on risk.
Some advocates dismiss the very existence of risk due to
the role of scientific knowledge in GMOs. According to this
view scientists from Monsanto and similar companies can be
trusted to provide safe foods without risk and even a question
about risk is without basis. Scientific knowledge as a source of
engineering innovation has a long tradition. At the same time,
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engineering itself is a different discipline and has different
imperatives. While construction of bridges and buildings relies
upon well established rules of physics, the existence of risks
does not end with that knowledge and must be considered
directly in planning and construction as it is in other forms of
engineering. The existence of risk in engineering even where
knowledge is much better established than genetics is widely
recognized. That proponents dismiss the very existence of
risk, attests to their poor understanding or blind extrinsically
motivated advocacy.
The FDA has adopted as a policy the approach that current
scientific knowledge assures safety of GMOs, and relies upon
Monsanto or similar companies for assurances. It therefore
does not test the impact of chemical changes in GMO plants on
human health or ecological systems. This despite experiments
that show that increased concentrations of neurotoxins in
maternal blood are linked to GMOs [21]. A variety of studies
show experimental evidence that risks exist [22], [23], [24],
[25] and global public health concerns are recognized [27].
We note that it is possible that there are significant impacts of
neurotoxins on human cognitive function as a result of GMO
modification, as FDA testing does not evaluate this risk.
Consistent with these points, the track record of the ex-
perts in understanding biological and medical risks has been
extremely poor. We need policies to be robust to such miscal-
culations. The "expert problem" in medicine by which experts
mischaracterize the completeness of their own knowledge is
manifest in a very poor historical record of risks taken with
innovations in biological products. These range from biofuels
to transfat to nicotine, etc. Consider the recent major drug
recalls such as Thalidomide, Fen-Phen, Tylenol and Vioxx—
all of these show blindness on the part of the specialist to
large scale risks associated with absence of knowlege, i.e.,
Black Swan events. Yet most of these risks were local and
not systemic (with the exception of biofuel impacts on global
hunger and social unrest). Since systemic risks would result
in a recall happening too late, we need the strong version of
the PP.
A sobering evidence showing how scientists in the biolog-
ical fields can know their area very well yet make erroneous
probabilistic statements is as follows. Where X and Y are two
random variables, the properties of the difference between the
two, i.e. X − Y , say the variance, probabilities, and higher
order attributes are markedly different from the difference
in properties. So where E is the expectation (the expected
average), and V the variance, E (X − Y ) = E(X) − E(Y )
but of course, V ar(X − Y ) 6= V ar(X) − V ar(Y ), etc. for
higher order statistics. It means that P-values are different, and
of course the coefficient of variation ("Sharpe"). Where σ is
the standard deviation of the variable (or sample):
E(X − Y )
σ(X − Y ) 6=
E(X)
σ(X)
− E(Y ))
σ(Y )
The problem was described in Fooled by Randomness:
A far more acute problem relates to the outperfor-
mance, or the comparison, between two or more
persons or entities. While we are certainly fooled
by randomness when it comes to a single times
series, the foolishness is compounded when it comes
to the comparison between, say, two people, or a
person and a benchmark. Why? Because both are
random. Let us do the following simple thought
experiment. Take two individuals, say, a person and
his brother-in-law, launched through life. Assume
equal odds for each of good and bad luck. Out-
comes: lucky-lucky (no difference between them),
unlucky-unlucky (again, no difference), lucky- un-
lucky (a large difference between them), unlucky-
lucky (again, a large difference).
Ten years later (2011) it was found that 50% of neuroscience
papers (peer-reviewed in "prestigious journals") that compared
variables got it wrong. In [26]:
In theory, a comparison of two experimental ef-
fects requires a statistical test on their difference.
In practice, this comparison is often based on an
incorrect procedure involving two separate tests in
which researchers conclude that effects differ when
one effect is significant (P < 0.05) but the other
is not (P > 0.05). We reviewed 513 behavioral,
systems and cognitive neuroscience articles in five
top-ranking journals (Science, Nature, Nature Neu-
roscience, Neuron and The Journal of Neuroscience)
and found that 78 used the correct procedure and 79
used the incorrect procedure. An additional analysis
suggests that incorrect analyses of interactions are
even more common in cellular and molecular neu-
roscience.
Fooled by Randomness was read by many professionals (to
put it mildly); the mistake is still being made. There are no
reason to believe that ten years from now, they will no longer
be making the mistake.
At the core lies our understanding of what both science and
risk management mean. Science is supposed to be fallible, in
fact it is grounded in fallibility since it is at its core an incre-
mental process, while risk management is about minimizing
fallibility, and the PP is about defining areas that require near-
infallibility.
I. The technological salvation fallacy
Iatrogenics is harm done by a healer despite positive inten-
tions, see Appendix A for a list of innovations in care that
have extensive documentation of adverse consequences. Each
of these underwent best practices testing that did not reveal
the iatrogenic consequences prior to widespread application.
The controlled tests that are used to evaluate innovations for
potential harm cannot replicate the large number of conditions
in which interventions are applied in the real world. Adverse
consequences are exposed only by extensive experience with
the combinatorial number of real world conditions. Natural,
i.e. evolutionary, selection implements as a strategy the use of
selection of lack of harm under such conditions in a way that
bounds the consequences because the number of replicates is
increased only gradually during the process in which success is
determined. In contrast, traditional engineering of technologi-
cal solutions does not. Thus, the more technological a solution
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to a current problem—the more it departs from solutions that
have undergone evolutionary selection—the more exposed one
becomes to iatrogenics owing to combinatorial branching of
conditions with adverse consequences.
Our concern here isn’t mild iatrogenics, but the systemic
case.
J. The pathologization fallacy
Today many mathematical or conceptual models that are
claimed to be rigorous are based upon unvalidated and incor-
rect assumptions and are not robust to changes in these as-
sumptions. Such models are deemed rational in the sense that
they are logically derived from their assumptions, and, further,
can be used to assess rationality by examining deviations from
such models, as indicators of irrationality. Except that it is
often the modeler who is using an incomplete representation of
the reality, hence using an erroneous benchmark for rationality.
Often the modelers are not familiar with the dynamics of
complex systems or use antiquated statistical methods that
do not take into account fat-tails and make inferences that
would not be acceptable under different classes of probability
distributions. Many biases, such as the ones used by Cass
Sunstein (mentioned above), about the overestimation of the
probabilities of rare events in fact correspond to the testers
using a bad probability model that is thin-tailed. See Ref. [6]
for a deeper discussion.
It has became popular to claim irrationality for GMO
and other skepticism on the part of the general public—not
realizing that there is in fact an "expert problem" and such
skepticism is healthy and even necessary for survival. For
instance, in The Rational Animal [28], the authors pathologize
people for not accepting GMOs although "the World Health
Organization has never found evidence of ill effects," a stan-
dard confusion of evidence of absence and absence of evi-
dence. Such pathologizing is similar to behavioral researchers
labeling hyperbolic discounting as "irrational" when in fact it
is largely the researcher who has a very narrow model and
richer models make the "irrationality" go away.
These researchers fail to understand that humans may have
precautionary principles against systemic risks, and can be
skeptical of the untested consequences of policies for deeply
rational reasons, even if they do not express such fears in
academic format.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
This formalization of the two different types of uncertainty
about risk (local and systemic) makes clear when the pre-
cautionary principle is, and when it isn’t, appropriate. The
examples of GMOs and nuclear energy help to elucidate the
application of these ideas. We hope this will help decision
makers to avoid ruin in the future.
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Medical Intervention Intended Effects Unintended Effects
Rofecoxib (Vioxx, Ceoxx, Ceeoxx) relieve osteoarthritis, dysmenorrhoea myocardial infarctions [30]
Thalidomide (Immunoprin, Talidex, Talizer,
Thalomid)
sedative severe birth defects [31]
Fen-phen (Pondimin) weight loss valvular heart disease, pulmonary hyperten-
sion [32]
Diethylstilbestrol (Distilbene, Stilbestrol,
Stilbetin)
reduce miscarriage cancerous tumors in daughters exposed in
utero [33]
Cerivastatin (Baycol, Lipobay) lower cholesterol, reduce cardiovascular dis-
ease
Rhabdomyolysis leading to renal failure
[34]
lobotomy improve mental disorder loss of personality, intellect [35]
Troglitazone (Rezulin, Resulin, Romozin,
Noscal)
antidiabetic, antiinflammatory drug-induced hepatitis [36]
Terfenadine (Seldane, Triludan, Teldane) antihistamine cardiac arrhythmia [37]
Phenylpropanolamine (Accutrim) appetite suppressant, stimulant, deconges-
tant
increased stroke [38]
hospitalization patient treatment and monitoring nosocomial infection; medication errors
[39]
antibiotics clear bacterial infections treatment-resistant bacteria [40]
antidepressants relieve depression increased suicide risk [41]
Encainide (Enkaid), flecainide (Tambocor) reduced arrhythmia increased mortality [42]
Acetaminophen (Tylenol) pain relief liver damage [43]
coronary angioplasty increased blood flow increased risk of death/myocardial infarc-
tion [44]
cosmetic surgery improved aesthetics infection, death, deformity, other malfunc-
tion [45]
obsessive hygiene keeping safe from ‘germs’ autoimmune disorders [46]
ear-tubes otitis media with effusion tympanosclerosis [47]
TABLE III: Examples of iatrogenics in the medical field. The upper portion of the table shows medications and treatments
whose use has been significantly reduced or completely discontinued due to their undesired effects (which were discovered
only after significant damage had been done). The lower portion of the table lists examples where unintended side effects are
significant but treatment continues to be applied due to expected benefits.
APPENDIX A
A SAMPLE OF IATROGENICS, "UNFORESEEN" CRITICAL ERRORS
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITION OF FAT TAILS AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MEDIOCRISTAN AND EXTREMISTAN
Probability distributions range between extreme thin-tailed
(Bernoulli) and extreme fat tailed [6]. Among the categories
of distributions that are often distinguished due to the conver-
gence properties of moments are: 1) Having a support that is
compact but not degenerate, 2) Subgaussian, 3) Gaussian, 4)
Subexponential, 5) Power law with exponent greater than 3, 6)
Power law with exponent less than or equal to 3 and greater
than 2, 7) Power law with exponent less than or equal to 2. In
particular, power law distributions have a finite mean only if
the exponent is greater than 1, and have a finite variance only
if the exponent exceeds 2.
Our interest is in distinguishing between cases where tail
events dominate impacts, as a formal definition of the bound-
ary between the categories of distributions to be considered
as Mediocristan and Extremistan. The natural boundary be-
tween these occurs at the subexponential class which has the
following property:
Let X = (Xi)1≤i≤n be a sequence of independent and
identically distributed random variables with support in the
positive real numbers (R+), with cumulative distribution func-
tion F . The subexponential class of distributions is defined by
[48],[49].
lim
x→+∞
1− F ∗2(x)
1− F (x) = 2
where F ∗2 = F ′∗F is the cumulative distribution of X1+X2,
the sum of two independent copies of X . This implies that the
probability that the sum X1+X2 exceeds a value x is twice the
probability that either one separately exceeds x. Thus, every
time the sum exceeds x, for large enough values of x, the
value of the sum is due to either one or the other exceeding
x—the maximum over the two variables—and the other of
them contributes negligibly.
More generally, it can be shown that the sum of n variables
is dominated by the maximum of the values over those vari-
ables in the same way. Formally, the following two properties
are equivalent to the subexponential condition [50],[51]. For
a given n ≥ 2, let Sn = Σni=1xi and Mn = max1≤i≤n xi
a) limx→∞
P (Sn>x)
P (X>x) = n,
b) limx→∞
P (Sn>x)
P (Mn>x)
= 1.
Thus the sum Sn has the same magnitude as the largest
sample Mn, which is another way of saying that tails play
the most important role.
Intuitively, tail events in subexponential distributions should
decline more slowly than an exponential distribution for which
large tail events should be irrelevant. Indeed, one can show that
subexponential distributions have no exponential moments:∫ ∞
0
ex dF (x) = +∞
for all values of ε greater than zero. However,the converse isn’t
true, since distributions can have no exponential moments, yet
not satisfy the subexponential condition.
We note that if we choose to indicate deviations as negative
values of the variable x, the same result holds by symmetry for
extreme negative values, replacing x → +∞ with x → −∞.
For two-tailed variables, we can separately consider positive
and negative domains.
APPENDIX C
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS OF FRAGILITY
The expositions and proofs are detailed in [55] and [6].
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